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ABSTRACT 
Simulated outcomes of agricultural production decisions in the Argentine Pampas 
were used to examine objective functions with greater psychological plausibility 
than expected utility (EU) maximization, in particular, regret-adjusted expected 
utility and prospect theory value maximization.  For each objective function, we 
provide the distribution of production enterprises on a hypothetical 600 ha farm 
optimal for either land owners or tenants (owners are subject to an optimization 
constraint that reflects a crop-rotation regimen).  We provide an explicit 
functional form for each objective function, propose an equivalent, but more 
mathematically-tractable formulation for the prospect theory value-function 
maximization, and explore a broad parameter space.  Optimal enterprise 
allocation differs for the three objective functions and for different parameter 
values, especially for land tenants, whose enterprise allocation is less constrained.  
The effects of regret are minor compared to the effects of loss aversion and gain-
loss reference point of prospect theory.  Our results demonstrate in a non-
laboratory decision context that psychologically plausible deviations from EU 
maximization matter.  They can be used to explain observed land allocation 
decisions inconsistent with EU maximization and to identify segments of decision 
makers who differ in decision objectives or optimization constraints as the result 
of socioeconomic/demographic or psychological differences. 
 DRAFT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Historical evolution of theories of 
rational choice 
The objective function or choice criterion that 
decision makers seek to optimize has been the 
object of theoretical and empirical 
investigation for centuries (Machina 1987; 
Starmer 2000; Schoemaker 1982).  The first 
candidate, introduced in the mid-17
th century, 
was the maximization of expected monetary 
values. This concept soon encountered 
problems because it conflicted with the 
intuition of educated decision makers, as in 
the so-called St. Petersburg paradox, where 
people pay only a small amount of money for 
a game of infinite mathematical expectation. 
To resolve the St. Petersburg paradox, 
Bernoulli (1954/1738) proposed that people 
maximize the expected utility of wealth rather 
than expected monetary value, postulating 
that money and wealth have diminishing 
returns. The work by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944, 1947) provided an 
explicit formulation of expected utility (EU) 
and an axiomatic foundation.  Subsequent 
extensions and variations are described by 
Schoemaker (1982). The EU utility model has 
been central in the analysis of choice under 
risk and uncertainty. It has been successful 
not only because of its compelling axiomatic 
foundation and ability to describe economic 
choices, but also because of its mathematical 
tractability (Woodward 1998).  
Despite its obvious strengths, EU 
maximization as the (sole) objective of risky 
choice has encountered some opposition in 
recent years.  There is both experimental and 
real-world evidence that individuals often do 
not behave in a manner consistent with EU 
theory (Camerer 2000; McFadden 1999), 
including the classical demonstrations 
referred to as the Allais (1953) and Ellsberg 
(1961) paradoxes.  A central assumption of 
EU theory is that the utility of decision 
outcomes is determined entirely by the final 
wealth they generate regardless of context, 
i.e., that it is an absolute or reference-
independent construct.  Yet, decision-makers’ 
evaluation of outcomes appears to be 
influenced by a variety of relative 
comparisons (Kahneman 2003).  In one such 
comparison, decision-makers contrast the 
outcome of their decision to what might have 
happened had they made a different choice. 
When, for the same state of the world, the 
expected outcome of an action compares 
unfavorably with the expected outcome of a 
different (counterfactual) action, decision-
makers experience regret. Regret theory, 
independently introduced by Loomes and 
Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982), introduces 
the effect of anticipated regret as a correction 
to classical utility theory. It formalizes the 
process by which decision-makers experience 
regret about their action if their realized 
outcome is worse than the counterfactual 
outcome, or rejoice if their realized outcome 
is better. Consistent with a negativity effect 
found in many judgment domains (Weber 
1994), feelings of regret are stronger than 
feelings of rejoicement. Since people 
anticipate experiences of regret, they choose 
such that their course of action minimizes 
anticipated post-decisional regret. That is, 
regret theory predicts that people act not to 
maximize expected utility but to maximize an 
expected utility that has been modified by 
consideration of anticipated regret. 
Minimization of anticipated decision regret is 
a goal frequently observed, even if it results 
in lower material profitability (Markman et 
al. 1993).  
Prospect theory (Kahneman Tversky 1979) 
and its modification, cumulative prospect 
theory (Tversky Kahneman 1992; Fennema 
Wakker 1997) currently have become the 
most prominent alternatives to EU theory.   
Prospect theory formalizes another relative 
comparison observed when decision makers 
evaluate the utility of decision outcomes.  Its 
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value function v is defined in terms of relative 
gains or losses, that is positive or negative 
deviations from a reference point. Value 
therefore is determined by changes in wealth, 
rather than reference-independent states of 
wealth as in utility theory (Kahneman 2003). 
Furthermore, the value function for losses is 
steeper than the value function for gains, 
resulting in a sharp kink at the reference 
point.  This feature of the value function 
models the phenomenon of loss aversion, i.e., 
the observation that the negative experience 
or disutility of a loss of a given magnitude is 
larger than the positive experience or utility 
of a gain of the same magnitude.  Empirical 
studies have consistently confirmed loss 
aversion as an important aspect of human 
choice behavior (Schmidt Zank 2005; 
Camerer 2005). Rabin (1998) emphasized the 
growing importance of loss aversion as a 
psychological finding which should be 
integrated into economic analysis. In 
particular, loss aversion is the most important 
explanation for phenomena such as the 
endowment effect (Thaler 1980), the status 
quo bias (Samuelson Zeckhauser 1988; 
Johnson Goldstein 2003), and the equity 
premium puzzle (Benartzi Thaler 1995).  In 
another deviation from EU theory, prospect 
theory predicts that risk attitudes depend on 
how a problem is framed, in particular, that 
risk-averse behavior will predominate if 
outcomes are perceived to be gains (with a 
concave value function), but that risk-seeking 
behavior will predominate if outcomes are 
perceived to be losses (with a convex value 
function). Finally, prospect theory differs 
from EU theory in the way it handles 
probability information, although this is not 
relevant to the work presented here.  
1.2  Objective functions considered in this 
study 
In this paper we compare and contrast the 
objective functions or choice criteria 
associated with EU, regret-adjusted utility, 
and prospect theories. Formulations of these 
three objective functions are applied to a real-
world optimization problem in agricultural 
management. EU maximization is a widely 
used criterion in agricultural economics, and 
thus is a useful benchmark against which to 
compare the results of other objective 
functions.  Given the increasing evidence that 
affective processes play an important and 
often decisive role in many decision 
situations (e.g., Damasio 1995; Loewenstein 
et al. 2001) and the fact that the feeling of 
regret probably has important learning 
functions, we explore the implications of 
introducing a regret correction to expected 
utility.  Finally, we consider prospect theory 
for its ability to resolve the Allais and 
Ellsberg paradoxes and to accommodate other 
phenomena inconsistent with EU theory, 
including real-world choice behavior in 
diverse contexts (Camerer 2000).  Prospect 
theory has received limited attention in the 
agricultural economics or agricultural 
decision-making literature. Collins et al. 
(2001) used prospect theory to re-interpret 
changing risk preferences in grass seed 
growers, and Reusser et al. (2004) used it as 
one of their models when examining how 
uncertainty propagated throughout an agent-
based model. Eggert and Martinsson (2004) 
elicit the risk preferences of commercial 
fishers and find them more consistent with 
prospect theory than EU. We argue that as 
proven and mathematically tractable 
alternatives to the EU model become 
available, agricultural and resource 
economists along with other economists 
should begin to consider alternative objective 
functions and to explore how they might 
improve analysis and insight (Woodward, 
1998).  
1.3  Objectives and contributions 
The main objective of this paper is to 
examine the nature and magnitude of 
differences in the agricultural production 
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decisions identified as “optimal” by 
maximization of the objective functions 
associated with EU, regret, and prospect 
theory. Most studies comparing these choice 
models have focused on (often hypothetical) 
monetary lottery choices in laboratory 
studies.  It is important to determine the 
extent to which these choice theories make 
different prescriptions for or predictions of 
behavior in more complex, real-world 
contexts and to understand the nature of these 
differences. Much is at stake, since those 
deviations matter a great deal in terms of 
what we need from agriculture, such as rural 
incomes, food security, export earnings and 
agro-environmental amenities. 
The paper makes three types of contributions. 
(1) We provide explicit functional forms for 
objective functions for which accepted forms 
do not exist (e.g., for regret theory).  For 
functions that are incompatible with widely 
used optimization tools, we develop 
equivalent but more tractable formulations. 
For instance, the discontinuity in the 
derivative of prospect theory’s value function 
provides a problem for the GAMS 
optimization software (Gill et al., 2000) 
widely used by economists. Although other 
algorithms can handle such discontinuities, 
they tend to get unstable solutions and users 
are warned to verify results. Whether explicit 
functional forms for objective functions do 
not exist or are in need of improvement, it is 
important for the decision analytic 
community to agree on common formulations 
in order to allow for the replication and 
comparison of results.  We hope that our 
paper will contribute to such standardization.  
(2)  It provides a mechanism to explain 
observed land allocation decisions that are 
inconsistent with EU maximization with 
reference to alternative objective functions. 
(3) Its identification of the agricultural 
production decisions that are optimal with 
respect to the three objective functions (for a 
broad range of plausible parameter values for 
each function) will allow researchers to 
identify different segments of decision 
makers who might differ in objective 
functions or optimization constraints as the 
result of socioeconomic/demographic or 
psychological differences.   
1.4  A case study: agricultural production 
decisions in the Argentine Pampas 
Our case study targets agricultural production 
in the Pampas of central eastern Argentina. 
We focus on agricultural decision-making in 
the Pampas for several reasons.  (1) In non-
centrally planned economies like Argentina, 
agricultural production decisions are 
overwhelmingly made by individual decision-
makers (farmers, professional farm managers, 
technical advisors).  The ability to predict 
optimal decisions at the individual level and 
to model differences in (presumably optimal) 
observed decisions as resulting from either 
differences in objective functions or in 
parameter values within the same objective 
function, therefore, has much utility.  (2) 
Agricultural production involves a variety of 
real-world decisions, with important 
economic consequences and thus is a useful 
test bed for the exploration of the 
implications of alternative choice theories and 
their objective functions.  (3) The annual 
cycle of agricultural production provides rich 
opportunities (i.e., ready replications and 
variations) for the study of real-world 
decisions.  (4) The collection of agricultural 
statistics is common and institutionalized in 
many countries therefore data about 
agricultural production decisions are more 
available and more reliable than decisions in 
other sectors. (5) The scale of production 
systems in the Argentine Pampas and 
available technology are very similar to those 
of other important production regions (e.g., 
the American Corn Belt), which makes our 
results applicable to a broader set of regions. 
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2. OBJECTIVE  FUNCTIONS 
CONSIDERED 
2.1 EU  maximization 
We define a risky prospect 
 as the ensemble of 
possible wealth/outcomes   with associated 
probabilities 
11 ( , ;....; , ) nn qp w p w =
i w
i p  that are non-negative and add 
up to one. A common formulation (Hardaker 
et al. 2004, p. 104) states that a decision-
maker evaluates the expected utility of 
prospect   as  q
() ( ) ii
i
EU q pu w =∑ .              (1) 
The real-valued utility function   is given by 
Pratt (1964) as: 
() u ⋅
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
=
≠
− ∝
−
1 ln
1
1 ) (
1
r f w
r if
r
w
w u
r
  ,            (2)
where   is the coefficient of constant relative 
risk aversion (CRRA). CRRA implies that 
preferences among risky prospects are 
unchanged if all payoffs are multiplied by a 
positive constant (Hardaker et al., 2004). The 
curvature of the utility function, defined by 
parameter
r
r , captures all information 
concerning risk attitude.                                                     
2.2  Regret-corrected expected utility 
maximization  
A formulation for the expected value of the 
utility of outcomes corrected by anticipated 
regret was presented by Braun and Muermann 
(2004), who called this function Regret-
Theoretical Expected Utility (RTEU). Their 
formulation is applicable to continuous states 
of the world, whereas our application 
provides discrete states of the world 
corresponding to different cropping cycles. 
The discrete form of RTEU for risky prospect 
 (defined in the same way as for expected 
utility) can be written as 
q
{}
1
() ( ) ( )
n
ii i
i
RTEU q p u w k g u
=
=− ∑ Δ
) i
  .     (3) 
This expression depends not just on possible 
outcomes/wealth  , but also contains an 
additively separable regret function that is 
increasing in the difference between the 
utilities of the realized and unrealized 
outcomes. The correction to utility due to 
anticipated regret is captured by the 
difference 
i w
max () ( i uu w u w Δ= −  ,              (4) 
where   is the maximum outcome that 
could have been realized in state of the world 
i, under a counterfactual action. The 
difference 
max w
i u Δ  must be ≥ 0.  Factor  , 
initially introduced by Loomes and Sugden 
(1982) and subsequently used by Braun and 
Muermann (2004), weights the effect of 
regret. 
k
The regret function   in Eq.  3 needs to 
increase as a function of  .  To obtain a 
more specific functional form for 
() g ⋅
i u Δ
() g ⋅ , Braun 
and Muermann (2004) proposed three 
desirable properties for it: 
(0) 0 g =  ,                                       (5a) 
() 0 g uu ′ Δ >∀ Δ   ,  and           (5b) 
"( ) 0 g uu Δ >∀ Δ   ,                  (5c) 
 
where   and   indicate, respectively, the 
first and second derivatives 
' g '' g
ddu Δ . The first 
condition (Eq.  5a) states that when the 
difference with respect to the optimum value 
is null there is no regret. The second 
condition (Eq. 5b) states that   ought to be 
an increasing function, implying that when 
() g ⋅
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the difference between the counterfactual 
option and the chosen option increases, regret 
also must increase.   
Although the first two requirements seem 
reasonable, we see no compelling arguments 
for the third condition (Eq.  5c).     
Furthermore, Laciana et al. (2005) showed 
that this condition cannot apply if regret 
theory is to produce the pattern of preferences 
described by the Allais (1953) paradox. To do 
so, Laciana et al. (1995) show that function 
 must instead satisfy the condition  () g ⋅
() 0 gu ′′ Δ< ∀ Δ u   .            (5d) 
Laciana et al. (2005) propose the following 
explicit form for function   that satisfies 
the first two conditions posed by Braun and 
Muermann (2004) and the modified third 
condition.
() g ⋅
1  
() 1
u gu β
Δ Δ= −  ,                    (6) 
where parameter β  (01 β ≤< ) must be fitted 
from experimental results and describes the 
decision maker’s sensitivity to the magnitude 
of   , with a more differentiated response 
for larger values of 
i u Δ
β . 
2.3   Prospect theory’s value maximization 
In prospect theory (Kahneman Tversky 
1979), the subjective value of a prospect is 
defined as: 
() ( ) ( ) i
i
Vq p v w =Ω Δ ∑ i
                                                
  ,         (7) 
where   represents the difference between 
outcome   and a reference point  , a free 
i w Δ
i w ref w
 
1 The function proposed by Laciana et al. was 
intended to reproduce specifically the pattern 
of preferences presented by Allais (1953).  
parameter, that separates perceived gains 
from perceived losses. The value of this 
difference is defined by 
() () vw hw w
α
Δ=Δ Δ               (8) 
Function  ( hw ) Δ  is the step function 
10
()
0
if w
hw
if w λ
Δ≥ ⎧
Δ= ⎨− Δ< ⎩             (9) 
where  λ is a parameter ( 1 λ > ) that reflects 
the degree of loss aversion.  The exponent α  
in Eq. 8 ranges between 0 and 1 and describes 
the nonlinearity of the value function, 
therefore accounting for the degree of risk 
aversion (concavity) in the gain region and 
risk seeking (convexity) in the loss region.   
The evaluation of risky prospects is based on 
subjective probability weights that do not 
always correspond to the objective 
probabilities. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
propose the nonlinear function    () p Ω
() ()
1 ()
1
p
p
pp
γ
γ γ γ
Ω=
+−
           (10) 
to model the subjective weight of event 
probabilities, which overweights objective 
probabilities below 0.3 or so and 
underweights larger probabilities. The value 
of  () p Ω  depends on positive parameter γ , 
that must be empirically estimated. 
 
3.  CASE STUDY DETAILS 
In this paper, we identify agricultural 
production decisions that are optimal under 
different objective functions. The set of 
decisions examined are related to the 
production of cereals and oilseeds in the 
Pampas region of central-eastern Argentina, 
one of the most important agricultural regions 
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in the world (Hall et al. 1992). In this section, 
we first describe the production systems in 
this region.  We then define a set of cropping 
enterprises that encompasses a realistic range 
of management options and initial soil 
conditions for the typical crops in the region, 
namely maize, soybean, and a wheat-soybean 
doublecrop.  Next we describe how yields and 
economic returns are simulated for each 
cropping enterprise using historical climate 
data, biophysical models, and realistic cost 
estimates. These results are used as input to 
different optimization procedures, described 
in Section 4. 
3.1  The area of study 
The climate, soils, and cropping systems of 
the Argentine Pampas have been 
characterized by Hall et al. (1992). In 
particular, we focus on the region near 
Pergamino (33º  56'  S, 60º  33'  W), the most 
productive subregion of the Pampas (Paruelo 
& Sala 1993). Two characteristics of 
agricultural production in the study region 
have implications for the optimization 
described below. First, agriculture in the 
Pampas is market-oriented and technology-
intensive. As a consequence, a broad 
spectrum of agronomic management options 
exists and can be explored in the optimization 
process. Second, a considerable proportion of 
the area currently farmed is not owned by the 
farmers exploiting it. Very short land leases 
(usually one year) provide incentives for 
tenants to maximize short-term profits via 
highly-profitable crops. In contrast, land 
owners tend to rotate crops to steward long-
term sustainability of production and soil 
quality. Given the differences in decision-
making goals and constraints between land 
owners and tenants, we model the two groups 
separately. 
3.2 Crop  enterprises 
We defined 64 different cropping enterprises 
that reflect a realistic range of cultivation 
options for the study area. Each enterprise 
involves the combination of (a) a given crop 
(maize, full-cycle soybean and wheat 
soybean), (b)  various agronomic decisions 
(cultivar/hybrid, planting date, fertilization 
options), and (c)  a set of initial conditions 
(water and nitrogen in the soil at planting) 
that result from previous production 
decisions. That is, several enterprises may be 
associated with the same crop, although 
involving different management options. 
Management variables and their simulated 
levels for each cropping enterprise defined 
are listed in Table 1. 
3.3 Simulation of yields: agronomic models 
Yields for each enterprise were simulated 
using the crop models in the Decision 
Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer 
package (Jones et al. 1998): Generic-CERES 
(Ritchie et al. 1998) for maize and wheat, and 
CROPGRO (Boote et al. 1998) for soybean. 
These models have been calibrated and 
validated under field conditions in several 
production environments including the 
Pampas (Guevara et al. 1999; Meira et al. 
1999; Mercau et al. 2001). The information 
required to run the DSSAT models includes: 
(i)  daily weather data (maximum and 
minimum temperature, precipitation, solar 
radiation), (ii)  “genetic coefficients” that 
describe physiological processes and 
developmental differences among crop 
hybrids or varieties, (iii) a description of crop 
management, and (iv)  soil parameters, 
including soil moisture and N content at the 
beginning of simulations. Historical (1931-
2001) daily weather data for Pergamino 
provided information re category (i). Genetic 
coefficients, the management options that 
defined the enterprises, and likely ranges of 
initial soil conditions were provided by 
Asociación Argentina de Consorcios 
Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola 
(AACREA), a non-profit farmers’ group 
(similar in goals to the US Agricultural 
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Table 1. Management variables and their simulated levels for each cropping enterprise defined. The 
64 different enterprises are the result of combining different levels of each variable considered. For 
instance, the 24 enterprises involving maize result from combing one genotype, two planting dates, 
three doses of N fertilizer, one row spacing, two levels of initial soil water, and two levels of initial 
soil N, and (1 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 x 1 = 24). 
 
 
Crop 
Management variables 
Maize Soybean  Wheat -
Soybean 
N 3901  Scorpion 
(wheat)  Genotype  DK 752 
DM 4800  DM 4800 (soy) 
15 Sep  25 Oct  10 Jun
1
Planting date 
15 Oct  15 Nov  10 Jul
1
50 0  40  (wheat) 
75   60  (wheat)  Fertilizer added  
(kg N ha
-1) 
100   80  (wheat) 
0.70 0.35  0.19  (wheat) 
Row spacing (m) 
0.70 0.52  0.52  (soy) 
80 80 70  Available soil water at 
planting (%)  100 100  90 
50 40  Available soil N at 
planting (kg N ha
-1)  70 
50 
60 
Number of enterprises  24 16 24 
Extension Services) that partnered with us in 
this study. 
  Simulations assumed no irrigation, a very 
infrequent practice in the Pampas.  For each 
enterprise, 70 simulated yields were obtained 
(one for each cropping cycle in the 1931-
2001 historical record used). 
3.4  Simulation of economic outcomes 
Economic outcomes were simulated for a 
hypothetical 600-hectare farm, the median 
size of AACREA farms in the Pergamino 
region. We computed net economic returns 
per hectare  ij π  for year i and enterprise  j  as 
the difference between income and costs:  
() ij ij j j ij i i YP F V S T π = −+ + +  .       (11) 
Gross income per hectare   were the 
product of simulated yield for a year and 
enterprise   and a constant output price 
for each crop  . Assumed output prices 
were the median of 2000-2005 prices during 
the month when most of the harvest is 
( ij j YP)
() ij Y
() j P
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marketed (April, May, and January for maize, 
soybean, and wheat, respectively). After 
deducting export taxes charged by the 
Argentine government, these prices were 
78.9, 166.0, and 112.0 US $ ton
-1 for maize, 
soybean and wheat, respectively. 
Four different kinds of costs were involved in 
the computation of net returns per hectare: 
(i)  Fixed costs   for enterprise  () j F j  are 
independent of yield. For land owners, fixed 
costs included: (a)  crop production inputs 
(e.g., fertilizer, seed, field labors), and 
(b)  farmer’s salary, health insurance, and a 
fixed fiscal contribution. For land tenants, 
fixed costs also included (c)  land rental 
(assumed to be 232.5 $ ha
-1, equivalent to the 
price  of  1.4 tons of soybean)  and 
(d) management costs (12 $ ha
-1). 
(ii) Variable costs  are a function of yield 
on year i for enterprise 
() ij V
j . These costs 
included: (a)  harvesting costs, estimated as 
8% of gross income  , 
(b)  transportation costs (about 10  $  ton
() ij j YP
-1), 
(c)  sales tax and commissions, estimated as 
8% of gross income. Variable costs were the 
same for land owners and tenants. 
(iii) Structural costs ()  are applicable only 
to land owners and covered: (a) maintenance 
of farm infrastructure, (b)  real estate taxes, 
and (c)  management and technical advice. 
Structural costs are independent of farm 
activities or enterprise yields. For the sake of 
simplicity, however, they were approximated 
following a criterion used by AACREA: they 
were a percentage (23%, 18%, and 20% for 
maize, soybean and wheat-soybean 
respectively) of income per ha after 
subtracting variable costs 
i S
( ij j ij YP V) − . 
Because structural costs are incurred even if 
part of the farm is not cultivated, an implicit 
but not unreasonable assumption, given the 
high costs of land around Pergamino, is that 
the entire 600-ha area of the hypothetical 
farm is cultivated. 
(iv) Income tax ()  applies equally to land 
owners and tenants and was computed as 
follows:  
i T
()
,
i
ba c i f
T
ci f
ππ
π
a
a
− +≥ ⎧
= ⎨ < ⎩       (12) 
where   is a threshold income above which 
farmers pay an average tax rate b = 0.32. 
Below  , farmers pay a minimum tax 
assumed to be 59.33  $  ha
a
a
-1. To simplify 
calculations, an average annual income π  of 
177.5 $ ha
-1  (57.6 $ ha
-1) was assumed for 
owners (tenants). 
 
4. OPTIMIZATION 
PROCEDURE 
A whole farm production model was used to 
identify optimal decisions for the objective 
functions associated with EU, regret, and 
prospect theories. The choice variable in the 
optimization is the vector  16 ( ,...., ) 4 x xx =
G
 that 
includes the area in the 600-hectare 
hypothetical farm allocated to each of the 64 
alternative cropping enterprises considered. 
Different land amounts allocated to the 64 
enterprises were considered by the 
optimization of each objective function. The 
optimization was performed using algorithm 
MINO5 in the GAMS software package (Gill 
et al., 2000). 
4.1  Wealth and income 
For comparability, all objective functions are 
expressed in terms of a decision-maker’s 
wealth, either in an absolute sense (for EU 
and regret-adjusted EU), or as a difference 
from a specified reference level (in prospect 
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theory). The total wealth of a decision-maker 
in year i is 
0 i ww i π =+  ,                    (13) 
where   is the decision-maker’s initial 
wealth (i.e., prior to production decisions for 
year  ) and 
0 w
i i π  is the farm-wide income 
during year i, after deducting costs. Farm-
wide income  i π  is calculated as: 
1
m
ij
j
i j x π π
=
=∑   ,                  (14) 
where  ij π  is the net margin for year   and 
enterprise 
i
j  (Eq. 11) and  j x  is the amount of 
land allocated to enterprise  j  (i.e., a 
component of the land allocation vector x
G
). 
4.2  Expected Utility Optimization 
The expected utility (Eq.  1) of final wealth 
can be expressed as:  
()
1
()
n
ii
i
EUx puw x
=
⎡ = ⎣ ∑
GG
⎤ ⎦  ,          (15) 
where  i p  is the probability of a given climate 
scenario for year i. A climate scenario is 
defined as the climate conditions over an 
entire production cycle. We assume that all 
climate scenarios in the historical record have 
the same probability, i.e.  1
i p n = , where n is 
the number of cropping cycles in the 
historical climate data (in this case, 70 years). 
Therefore, we can write 
  ()
1
1
()
n
i
i
EUx uw x
n =
= ⎡ ⎣ ∑
GG
⎤ ⎦  .           (16) 
The next step is the optimization 
* max ( ) ( ) x EUx E Ux =
GG
4
,             (17) 
where 
** *
16 ( ,...., ) x xx =
G
 indicates the 
proportion of land allocated to each enterprise 
that maximizes the value of EU. 
4.3 Regret-corrected  Utility Optimization 
The goal is to obtain the decision vector x
∗ G
 
that maximizes the function  ( ) RTEU x
G
 given 
by Eq. 3: 
* max ( ) ( ) x RTEU x RTEU x =
G G
f
  .       (18) 
This maximization is performed in the same 
way as for expected utility. 
4.4  Prospect Theory Value Optimization 
In prospect theory, value is defined by 
changes in wealth rather than reference-
independent states of wealth.  Outcomes   
are evaluated as gains or losses with respect 
to a reference value  : 
i w
ref w
iir e www Δ =−  .                  (19) 
One plausible reference value of wealth that 
determines whether a farmer thinks of another 
wealth level as a gain or a loss is the income 
 that a farmer could achieve with minimal 
effort (e.g., by renting his/her land) added to 
the decision-maker’s initial wealth : 
r w
0 ref r ww w = +  .                (20) 
Combining  Eqs. 13 and 19  with  Eq. 20  we 
obtain: 
ii w r w π Δ =− .                 (21) 
The total value function for prospect theory 
(Eq. 7) then can be rewritten as:  
() ( ) ()
1
n
ii
i
Vx pv wx
=
⎡ =Ω Δ ⎣ ∑ ⎤ ⎦
G G
 .       (22) 
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4.5  Optimization constraints  
As for previous objective functions, all 
climate scenarios are assumed to have the 
same probability (i.e., 1
i p n =
() i
 ), therefore 
p Ω i
()
 is independent of  . Rewriting Eq. 22, 
we obtain 
()
1
1
n
i
i
Vx v wx
n =
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ =Ω Δ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∑
GG
 ,      (23) 
which indicates that the constant  ( ) 1
n
* max ( ) ( ) xVx Vx =
GG
() h ⋅
0 i w Δ=
() h ⋅ 
() h ⋅
Ω  is 
irrelevant for the optimization; thus one needs 
not worry about the functional form of Ω.  
The optimization is performed in a way 
analogous to Eq. 16: 
 .             (24) 
Optimizing the value function with the 
GAMS software (Gill et al., 2000) available 
to us was problematic because of the 
discontinuity of function   (defined in 
Eq. 9)  at   (where prospect theory’s 
value function has a sharp kink and is not 
differentiable).  To address the problem, we 
used a continuous function   that is 
numerically equivalent to  : 
()( ) 1 () 1 1 t a n h 2 hx x λλ ρ ⎡⎤ =− + + ⎣⎦

  (25) 
where 
ρ 1 > ; large values of 
ρ  is an arbitrary parameter such that 
ρ (we used ρ =10) 
reproduce function h  more closely. 
Justification for this approximation can be 
found in Laciana and Weber (2005). 
() ⋅
As previously mentioned, allocation of land 
to cropping enterprises differs for land 
owners and tenants in the Pergamino region. 
Land owners tend to adhere to a rotation of 
crops that offers advantages for soil 
conservation and control of pests and 
diseases. In contrast, land tenants seek high 
profits during short leases (usually one year) 
and thus usually select enterprises with the 
greatest economic returns.  The clear 
differences in enterprise allocation between 
land tenure regimes suggest that we explore 
optimal decisions separately for land owners 
and tenants. 
As discussed in Section 2, each objective 
function has a set of parameters.  In some 
cases, the value of a given parameter 
characterizes a personality characteristic (e.g., 
degree of risk aversion or loss aversion) that 
may vary among decision-makers. In other 
cases, there are no widely accepted values for 
a parameter, therefore a broad range of 
plausible values must be considered. In this 
section, we describe and justify the central (or 
nominal) parameter values; the full set of 
values explored is listed in Table  2
4.6  Parameter space explored for each 
objective function 
With three major cropping systems (maize, 
soybean, and a wheat-soybean double crop) 
the rotation advocated by AACREA allocates 
about 33.3% of the land to each of these 
cropping systems in a given year. To allow 
owners some flexibility in land allocation, we 
introduced two constraints in the optimization 
procedure: land assigned to a crop could be 
no less than 25%, or more than 45% of the 
farm area.  These constraints did not apply to 
land tenants, who could allocate the entire 
farmed area to a single crop. The lack of 
allocation constraints is consistent with the 
observed increase in mono-cropping of 
soybean that has occurred in the Pampas in 
the last few years (Satorre 2005).  
 
 
Table 2.  Range of parameters considered for each objective function. 
 
 
Objective 
Function 
Parameter  Land owners    Land tenants   
   Nominal value  Values explored  Nominal value  Values explored 
Initial wealth ( )  0 w 1400 $ ha
-1 700, 800, 900, 1000, 
1100, 1200, 1300, 
1400, 1500, 1600, 
1700, 1800, 1900, 
2000, 2100, 2200, 
2300, 2400 
1000 $ ha
-1 700, 800, 900, 
1000, 1100, 1200, 
1300, 1400, 1500, 
1600 
Expected 
Utility 
Risk aversion 
coefficient (r ) 
1  -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4  1  -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 
4 
k   -  0.155, 0.3595, 0.564  Same as for land owners  Regret-corrected 
Utility  β   -  0, 0.0005, 0.005, 0.05, 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 
0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
Same as for land owners 
Reference wealth 
(w )  r
232.5 $ ha
-1 100, 175, 232.5, 325, 
400, 500 
20 $ ha
-1 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 
50, 60, 70, 80 
Risk aversion (α )  0.88  0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75, 
0.8, 0.85, 0.88, 0.9, 1 
Same as for land owners 
Prospect Theory 
Value Function 
Loss aversion (λ )  2.25  1, 2.25, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 
5, 5.5, 6 
Same as for land owners 
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4.6.1  Expected Utility. 
The expected utility function has two 
parameters: (i)  the decision maker’s initial 
wealth   and (ii)  the risk-aversion 
coefficient  . Initial wealth   is defined as 
liquid assets. For land owners, this quantity 
was estimated as 40% of the value of the farm 
land. The definition is based on the 
assumption that a farmer will not sacrifice 
future income potential by selling crop land, 
but can borrow up to 40% of his/her land 
value. The 1994-2003 average value of land 
for Pergamino was 3541  $  ha
0 w
r 0 w
0 w
0 w
r
r
-1 
(http://www.mlb.com.ar/nota_arre3.asp), 
making   equal to 1400 $ ha
-1 (3541 $ ha
-1 
x 0.4).  For land tenants, we assumed a   
value of 1000 $ ha
-1, the liquid assets required 
to finance two complete cropping cycles (i.e., 
in case of a total loss in one cycle, the farmer 
still has capital to fund a second cycle).  For 
the risk-aversion coefficient  , we followed 
Anderson and Dillon’s (1992)  classification: 
0.5 is hardly risk averse; 1.0, somewhat risk 
averse (normal); 2.0, rather risk averse; 3.0, 
very risk averse; and 4.0, extremely risk 
averse. We also included risk-seeking 
behavior and risk indifference by also 
considering   values of –0.5 and 0.0. The 
range of   values was the same for owners 
and tenants. 
r
4.6.2  Regret-corrected Expected Utility. 
The regret-corrected expected utility has the 
same parameters as the EU model (  and 
), and for which we used the same ranges. It 
also has two other parameters: a factor   that 
weighs the regret, and parameter 
0 w
r
k
β  
associated with the regret function  () g ⋅  (see 
Eq. 6).  Appropriate bounds for k  and β  
were derived by Laciana et al. (2005) to 
ensure that regret theory reproduce the pattern 
of preferences described by the Allais 
paradox. These ranges are 0.155 ≤  0.564 
and 
k ≤
00 . 9 β ≤ < 0 w . With the exception of  , 
all parameter values were the same for 
owners and tenants. 
4.6.3  Prospect Theory Value Function. 
The value function is defined by (i)  a 
reference wealth   that separates outcomes 
perceived as gains and losses, (ii)  a risk 
aversion parameter 
r w
α , and (iii)  a loss 
aversion parameter λ  that quantifies the 
relative impact of gains and losses. For land 
owners,   was estimated as the income 
easily-achieved by renting the land instead of 
farming it. This value of   was estimated to 
be 232.5 $ ha
r w
r w
r w
-1 (a rental fee of 1.4 ton ha
-1 of 
soybean times a price of 166 $ ton
-1). For land 
tenants,   was estimated as the income 
obtained by placing the tenant’s initial wealth 
( = 1000 $ ha 0 w
-1, as described for EU) in a 
bank for six months (the duration of a 
cropping season) at an annual interest of 4% 
(representative of current rates in Argentina). 
The nominal    value,  then,  was 20 $ ha r w
-1. 
For the risk-aversion parameter 
This section describes the land allocations 
(i.e., the proportion of land assigned to 
different enterprises) identified as optimal for 
each objective function. The cropping 
enterprises selected during the optimization 
procedure (only seven out of 64 possible 
enterprises) are shown in Table 3. The table 
also shows the mean economic returns (profit 
after subtracting all costs) and their standard 
deviation (S.D.) over the 70 simulated 
cropping cycles.  
 
5.   RESULTS 
α  and the 
loss-aversion parameter λ , we used the 
values of 0.88 and 2.25, respectively, that 
were estimated by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) for both owners and tenants, but also 
explored other values (Table 2).  
 
 
Table 3.   Cropping enterprises selected during the optimization procedure (only seven out of 64 possible enterprises were selected). The 
combination of management variables that define each enterprise is shown. The table also shows the mean economic returns (profit after 
subtracting all costs) and their standard deviation (S.D.) over the 70 simulated cropping cycles. Results are presented both for land owners 
and tenants. For the wheat-soybean double crop, the superscripts a and b indicate values for wheat and soybean, respectively. 
 
Enterprise management  Economic returns for 
owners ($ ha
-1) 
Economic returns for 
tenants ($ ha
-1) 
Enterprise 
ID 
Genotype Planting 
date 
Fertilizer 
added (kg 
N ha
-1) 
Row 
spacing 
(m) 
Available 
soil water 
at 
planting 
(%) 
Available 
soil N at 
planting 
(kg N ha
-1) 
Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Maize 
Ma21 Sep  15  100  113.2  106.8  6.8  157.7 
Ma23 Oct  15  75  116.5  84.1  5.8  128.6 
Ma24 
DK752 
Oct 15  100 
0.70 100  70 
116.3 90.1  9.8  135.8 
Full-cycle soybean 
Soy14 DM4800  Oct  25  0  0.52  100  50  188.1  60.7  69.4  89.0 
Wheat-Soybean 
SW19 Jun  10  40  162.1  83.4  62.3  121.7 
SW20 Jun  10  60  167.3  84.7  72.3  122.5 
SW21 
Scorpion
a  
& 
DM4800
b
Jun 10  80 
0.19
a 
0.52
b 90 60 
168.8 85.0 77.6  122.0 
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5.1 EU  Maximization 
5.1.1  Land owners 
The enterprise allocation that maximized 
expected utility for land owners was constant 
for the full range of initial wealth and risk 
aversion values explored (Fig.  1). The 
maximum area allowed for one crop by the 
optimization constraints defined for owners   
(45% of total land) was allocated to full-cycle 
soybean Soy14, the enterprise with the 
highest average economic returns   
(188.1 $ ha
-1, Table  3). Conversely, the 
minimum area required by constraints (25%) 
was for maize, the crop with lowest average 
profits. Ma23, the enterprise with the highest 
average profits for this crop (116.5  $  ha
-1) 
was selected; another maize enterprise, Ma22, 
had similar mean profits but a higher 
dispersion of outcomes (implying higher risk) 
and thus was not picked. The remainder of 
the area (30%) was allocated to the wheat-soy 
enterprise SW21, which had average profits 
between those of full-cycle soy and maize     
(168.8 $ ha
-1). The stability of results for all 
parameter combinations illustrates the 
importance of constraints associated with 
maintaining a crop rotation: these constraints 
clearly override any financial or personality 
characteristics of a decision-maker. 
Figure 1.  Land allocation (as proportion 
of the hypothetical 600-ha farm) that 
maximizes expected utility for land 
owners. The selected combination of 
enterprises is constant for all initial wealth 
and risk aversion r .  0 w
 
5.1.2  Land tenants 
For land tenants, only two enterprises (full-
cycle soybean Soy14 and wheat-soybean 
SW21) were involved in the maximization of 
expected utility. Because of the markedly 
lower economic margins of maize enterprises 
(due to the combination of rental costs for 
tenants and low maize prices) and the lack of 
constraints requiring a minimum area for 
maize, the optimization did not select any 
enterprise involving this crop. Relative 
proportions of the selected enterprises 
depended on the combination of parameters.  
Fig.  2 has three panels with increasingly 
higher levels of risk aversion  (from top to 
bottom). In each panel, the optimal allocation 
of land is shown as a function of initial 
wealth  . For a risk-neutral decision-maker 
( =  0; Fig. 2, upper panel), the optimal 
action was to allocate the entire area to the 
double crop enterprise SW21; this result is 
constant for the entire range of values 
considered for  . Because the decision-
maker is risk-neutral, the selection of SW21 
was based only on its higher mean profit 
relative to Soy14 (77.6 $ ha
r
0 w
r
0 w
-1 vs. 69.4 $ ha
-1), 
and ignored the higher risks associated with 
the considerably larger dispersion of profits 
for this enterprise (122.0 $ ha
-1 vs. 89.0 $ ha
-1 
for Soy14). When moderate amounts of risk 
aversion are considered ( =1.5; Fig. 2, 
middle panel), the optimal action involved 
diversification of enterprises for most values 
of  . For low  , diversification is highest: 
60% of the land was allocated to SW21 and 
40% to Soy14. As   increases (and, thus, 
decision makers can afford higher financial 
r
0 w 0 w
0 w
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risks), the proportion of land assigned to 
SW21 increased until this enterprise occupied 
the entire area, resembling results for risk-
neutrality. Even with CRRA, absolute risk 
aversion declines with rising wealth. Finally, 
for a highly risk-averse decision-maker 
( =3.0; Fig. 2, bottom panel), the optimal 
land allocation was fairly conservative, as 
crop diversification (comparable proportions 
of SW21 and Soy14) prevailed throughout the 
 range. However, there was a minor effect 
of  : for initial wealth below 1100  $  ha
r
0 w
0 w
-1, 
Soy14 (less profitable, but also less risky) 
occupied a slightly higher area than SW21 
(more profitable but riskier). This allocation 
was reversed for higher   values.  0 w
Figure 2. Land allocation (as proportion of 
the hypothetical 600-ha farm) that 
maximizes expected utility for land 
tenants. The three panels show the results 
for risk neutrality (r =0, upper panel), 
moderate risk aversion (r =1.5, middle 
panel), and pronounced risk aversion 
( =3.0, bottom panel), in each case plotted 
as a function of initial wealth  . 
r
0 w
 
5.2  Regret-Adjusted Expected Utility 
Maximization 
5.2.1  Land owners 
The enterprise allocation that maximized 
regret-adjusted expected utility was the same 
as that for EU (Fig. 1). That is, no effects of 
anticipated regret were noticeable for any 
combination of parameter values. The lack of 
discernible regret effects is again due to the 
strong constraints imposed on optimal 
solutions by the owners’ modeled adherence 
to crop rotation. 
5.2.2  Land tenants 
The same two enterprises involved in the 
maximization of EU for tenants also 
maximized regret-adjusted expected utility: 
full-cycle soybean (Soy14) and wheat-
soybean (SW21). As for EU, the optimal 
proportions of these enterprises varied with 
the combination of parameters. Fig. 3 shows a 
matrix of panels combining selected values of 
regret parameters   (increasing from top to 
bottom) and 
k
β  (increasing from left to right). 
In each panel, the optimal allocation of land 
is shown as a function of risk aversion  .  r
 In the first row of Fig. 3, there was no regret 
effect (as   = 0), thus results coincided with 
those for EU. This row can be used as a 
reference to understand the effects of 
anticipated regret. A dashed vertical line in 
each panel indicates the   value at which the 
optimal action switched from a monoculture 
of SW21 to an enterprise diversification that 
also included Soy14 when no regret existed. 
In the top row of Fig. 3, this switch occurred 
k
r
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Figure 3. Land allocation (as proportion of the hypothetical 600-ha farm) that maximizes 
regret-corrected expected utility for land tenants. The different panels correspond to 
combinations of regret parameters   (increasing for top to bottom) and  k β  (increasing from 
left to right). In each panel, the optimal allocation of land is shown as a function of the risk 
aversion coefficient r. 
for   slightly below 1.  As we move down 
the columns of Fig. 3, parameter   increases 
indicating progressively higher degrees of 
anticipated regret. That is, the decision-maker 
gives increasing importance to the fact that a 
better option can exist. To avoid anticipated 
regret, the decision-maker becomes more 
risk-seeking. This result is illustrated by a 
displacement in the location of the switch 
towards enterprise diversification, which 
occurred at higher   values (above 1.0) than 
when regret did not exist. This displacement 
is most noticeable for lower 
r
k
r
β  values, for 
which any kind of deviation (∆u) from 
optimal outcomes results in considerable 
regret (left column of Fig. 3). 
As we move along the columns of Fig.  3, 
increases in β  indicate higher sensitivity in 
the experience of regret to the magnitude of 
∆u (as implied by the functional form of  () g ⋅  
in Eq. 6). For instance, if we focus on the 
center row of Fig.  3, we see that for a 
constant   value, the switch to enterprise 
diversification occurred at lower r  values as 
k
β  increased. That is, β  has an effect 
opposite to that of  . For high  k β  values 
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(Fig.  3, right column), the effects of regret 
were mostly unnoticeable and results seemed 
to coincide with those for EU (because regret 
only becomes noticeable for large values of 
∆u). A preliminary conclusion is that, at least 
for the combination of parameters explored, 
anticipated regret seemed to be a second-
order effect and did not change substantially 
the results based on expected utility theory. 
5.3 Prospect  theory 
5.3.1  Land owners 
The land allocation that maximized prospect 
theory’s value included, for all parameter 
combinations, full-cycle soybean Soy14 as 
the enterprise with the largest area. 
Conversely, enterprises involving maize 
(three different ones were selected: Ma21, 
Ma23, and Ma24) occupied the smallest area. 
The wheat-soy double crop (in most cases, 
enterprise SW21, but also SW20) occupied 
the remaining area. These results are 
consistent with the relative average 
profitability of each crop. Fig.  4 shows a 
matrix of panels combining different values 
of prospect theory parameters   (reference 
wealth, increasing from top to bottom) and 
r w
λ  
(loss aversion parameter, increasing from left 
to right). In each panel, the optimal allocation 
of land is shown as a function of risk 
preference parameter α . 
To interpret results in Fig.  4, one must 
understand interactions among prospect 
theory’s parameters. In particular, we focus 
on risk preference α  and reference wealth 
, as their interaction may produce 
apparently counterintuitive results. The effect 
of risk preference parameter 
r w
α  depends on 
whether the decision-maker perceives to be 
operating in the economic gains or losses 
domains. In the gains domain, the value 
function is concave (as for expected utility), 
and higher α  values indicate lower risk 
aversion. Conversely, in the domain of losses, 
the value function is convex thus higher α  
values indicate higher risk aversion. In turn, 
the likelihood of being in the domain of gains 
or losses is partly a function of  . Fig.  5 
displays histograms of the difference 
r w
( ij r w ) π −  between economic profits and   
for three maize enterprises (Ma21, Ma23, and 
Ma24) and three   values (100, 230, and 
325 $ ha
r w
r w
-1). As   increases, the proportion 
of negative differences (i.e., economic 
outcomes perceived as losses) for an 
enterprise is higher. Indeed, when 
=325 $ ha
r w
r w
-1 (bottom row of histograms), 
outcomes for all three maize enterprises are 
negative. 
The top left panel of Fig.  4 ( =100 $ ha r w
-1 
and  λ =1.00) serves as a reference to discuss 
the consequences of varying prospect 
theory’s parameters. In this panel, the optimal 
enterprise allocation was the same as that for 
EU maximization for land owners: 45% of 
Soy14, 30% of SW21, and 25% of Ma23 (see 
Fig. 1). The similarity with EU results is due 
to two facts. First, because λ =1.00, there is 
no loss aversion (i.e., gains and losses are 
valued equally by the decision-maker). 
Second, because   i s  l o w ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  
outcomes are positive (gains). 
r w
In the top middle panel of Fig.  4, λ  has 
increased to its nominal value of 2.25, 
indicating that losses of a given magnitude 
have more than twice as much impact as 
gains of the same magnitude. The reason that 
this increase in loss aversion has no impact on 
the optimal land allocation is that reference 
wealth is low ( =100 $ ha r w
-1), which means 
that the economic profits for the various 
enterprises are mostly higher than   and are 
thus perceived as gains.  With few losses, 
degree of loss aversion cannot be expected to 
have much impact on land allocation. 
r w
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Figure 4. Land allocation (as proportion of the hypothetical 600-ha farm) that maximizes 
prospect theory’s value function for land owners. The different panels correspond to 
combinations of   (reference wealth, increasing from top to bottom) and  r w λ  (loss aversion 
parameter, increasing from left to right). In each panel, the optimal allocation of land is shown 
as a function of the risk preference coefficient α . 
 
 
Moving now to the top right panel of Fig. 4, 
loss aversion increases to λ =3.50. In this 
panel, there is a switch between two of the 
wheat-soybean enterprises (SW21 and SW20) 
as a function of α  values. Below the nominal 
α  value of 0.88, SW20 is chosen whereas, 
above 0.88, SW21 is the selected enterprise. 
Again, because   is low (100 $ ha r w
-1), most 
outcomes will be perceived as gains, thus 
lower  α  values imply higher risk aversion 
and a choice of SW20 over SW21 is a more 
conservative strategy. Although the statistics 
of outcomes are fairly similar for both 
enterprises (Table  3), the proportion of 
negative outcomes (data not shown) is lower 
for SW20 than for SW21, making it a more 
attractive choice when losses are valued more 
than three times higher than gains. In 
contrast, for higher α  values risk aversion 
decreases, and the decision-maker selects the 
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Figure 5.  Histograms of the difference between net economic returns and prospect theory’s 
reference wealth ( ij r w ) π −  for land owners. Results are shown for three maize-related 
enterprises (Ma21, Ma23, and Ma24), and different reference wealth values (in $ ha
-1). The 
histograms display the simulated outcomes for 70 cropping cycles. 
 
enterprise with higher economic returns 
(SW21) even though it is riskier.  
As we move down the rows of Fig.  4 to 
higher reference levels wr, the main effect is a 
switch between maize enterprises (mostly 
Ma23 and Ma24, but Ma21 also appears). For 
α   <  0.88, Ma24 tends to prevail; for 
α   >  0.88, Ma23 is selected. The gross 
margin of both maize enterprises is similar 
but the variability of Ma24 (90.1  $  ha
-1) is 
higher than the corresponding value for Ma23 
(84.1 $ ha
-1). As   values increase, maize 
outcomes come to be encoded mostly as 
losses and low values of 
r w
α  are associated 
with risk-seeking behavior. In contrast, as α  
increases, the decision-maker becomes more 
risk-averse and the less risky Ma23 option is 
selected. 
5.3.2  Land tenants 
The land allocation that maximized prospect 
theory’s value function for tenants involved 
two enterprises: full-cycle soybean (Soy14) 
and wheat-soybean (SW21). As in previous 
cases, the specific proportions of these 
enterprises depended on the combination of 
parameters. 
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The top left panel of Fig. 6 ( =10 $ ha r w
-1 and 
λ =1.00) can be used as a reference to discuss 
the consequences of varying prospect 
theory’s parameters. In this panel, there is no 
loss aversion. Also, a low level of reference 
wealth puts more outcomes into the domain 
of gains, where low α  values make a 
decision-maker more risk-averse. As a result, 
a diversified land allocation including two 
enterprises (Soy14 and SW21) is selected. As 
α  increases and the decision-maker becomes 
less risk-averse, the allocation switches 
towards an increasingly higher proportion of 
SW21 (until mono-culture is reached), where 
SW21 has a higher margin but also is riskier. 
As we move along the top row of Fig. 6, loss 
aversion increases and we see a mixture of 
the two dominating enterprises in the central 
and right top panels. Nevertheless, there is a 
higher proportion of Soy14 which, despite 
having lower average profit than SW21, 
shows lower variability of outcomes. 
If we move down the left column of Fig. 6, 
the switch from diversification to a 
monoculture of SW21 begins at progressively 
lower values of α . This is due to the fact that 
as   increases, an increasing proportion of 
outcomes are perceived as a loss where α 
denotes risk-seeking.  Risk-seeking to neutral 
decision-makers choose the riskier option 
(SW21) in search of higher profitability, and 
thus enterprise selection in the bottom-left 
panel is identical to that of risk-neutral EU 
maximizers (top panel in Fig. 2). 
r w
This pattern is also apparent in the middle 
bottom panel of Fig. 6, where we now also 
have loss-aversion (λ = 2.25).  Its  high 
reference wealth (  = 80 $ ha r w
-1) implies that 
a high proportion of outcomes are perceived 
as losses. For low α values, the decision-
maker is more risk-seeking and thus selects 
riskier enterprises in search of higher profits 
to get out of the domain of losses. As α  
increases, risk seeking decreases and the 
selected allocation becomes diversified as 
loss aversion now takes effect, with a higher 
proportion of the less variable enterprise 
Soy14.  
When loss aversion is even stronger, as in the 
right panels of Fig. 6 (λ  = 3.50), it starts to 
take over and dictates diversification across 
the whole range of α, and even more so for 
higher levels of reference wealth, as more 
outcomes are in the domain of losses and 
hence subject to loss aversion. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
Our results demonstrate in a non-laboratory 
decision context that psychologically 
plausible deviations from EU maximization 
matter.  The optimal allocations for land 
owners dictated by some parameter 
combinations of prospect theory (namely the 
allocation of some land to SW20, Ma24 or 
Ma 21; see Fig.  4) for example, are not 
predicted by any parameter combination in 
either EU or regret-adjusted EU 
maximization. As another example, prospect-
theory value maximization allows tenants to 
allocate a much greater proportion of land to 
Soy14 than EU maximization (compare 
Figs. 6 and 2).  Given that an increasing trend 
towards a monoculture of soybean has been 
observed on the part of tenants in the 
Argentina Pampas (Satorre 2005), prospect- 
theory value maximization seems to be a 
plausible explanation.  
Another general observation about our results 
is that deviations from behavior predicted by 
EU maximization as the result of anticipated 
regret minimization are far less pronounced 
than deviations as the result of loss aversion 
and of different risk attitudes in the domain of 
gains and losses, embodied in prospect 
theory.  For land owners, whose choices are 
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constrained by the crop rotation regimen that 
is in their long-range interest, EU and RTEU 
optimization predict the same land allocation.  
For tenants, the main effect of minimizing 
anticipated regret is to delay diversification at 
lower levels of risk aversion. 
Optimization of any utility or value function 
reflects a tradeoff between the expected 
profits of an enterprise and its risk or 
dispersion of outcomes.  It is interesting to 
see that different objective functions shape 
the nature of this tradeoff in different ways.  
In particular, more risk-averse land allocation 
is encouraged by the individual difference 
parameter  , reflecting degree of risk-
aversion, and by lower initial wealth   in 
both EU and RTEU optimization.  In contrast, 
in prospect-theory value optimization, such 
behavior is encouraged by a lower reference 
wealth (that divides the perception of returns 
r
0 w
Figure 6.  Land allocation (as proportion of the hypothetical 600-ha farm) that maximizes 
prospect theory’s value function for land tenants. The different panels correspond to 
combinations of   (reference wealth in $ ha r w
-1, increasing from top to bottom) and λ  (loss 
aversion parameter, increasing from left to right). In each panel, the optimal allocation of land 
is shown as a function of the risk preference coefficient α . 
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into gains vs. losses) and much more by the 
individual difference parameter λ , reflecting 
degree of loss aversion, than by individual 
difference parameter α , reflecting risk 
preference, and equivalent to EU’s r .   
Similarly, less risk-averse land allocation is 
encouraged by different processes and 
parameters under the three objective 
functions. For EU maximization, both 
parameters   (less risk aversion) and   
(greater initial wealth) are deciding factors 
(top panel and right end of middle panel of 
Fig. 2). In RTEU optimization, greater weight 
placed on anticipated regret (parameter  ) 
also encourages greater risk taking at lower 
levels of risk-aversion (left side of bottom left 
panel in Fig. 3). In prospect-theory value 
optimization, on the other hand, less risk-
averse land allocations come about when the 
decision-maker has no loss aversion but a low 
reference value, resulting in most outcomes 
being perceived as losses for which choices 
are either risk-seeking or at best risk-neutral 
(bottom left panel of Fig. 6). 
r 0 w
k
6.1  Relevance of results 
We envision three main applications of the 
work presented here. First, an improved 
understanding of individual differences in 
preferences and objective functions allows for 
the development of agronomic advice tailored 
to the personality characteristics of different 
types of farmers. Such advice will be more 
effective than the common “one size fits all” 
technical recommendations. Second, 
knowledge of individual preferences may be 
helpful to guide the framing and to assess the 
acceptability of regional or national policies 
of agricultural sustainability (for example, 
policies that encourage crop diversification). 
Finally, an understanding of production 
decisions in agriculture may contribute to 
comprehension of a range of related issues, 
such as adoption of technological innovations 
and adaptation to climate change. 
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